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Abstract 
Recent literature stresses the importance of low productivity as a barrier to the 
international expansion of firms. But financial frictions or adverse employment 
conditions at home could matter as well. In this paper, we present new empirical evidence 
on the importance of these factors. We use a detailed micro-level dataset of German firms 
which simultaneously provides information on exports, financial frictions, and labor 
market conditions. Our paper has three main findings. First, in line with earlier literature, 
we find a positive impact of size and productivity on firms’ export activities. Second, 
financial constraints affect the entry into foreign market (extensive margin) more than the 
volume of exports (intensive margin). Third, labor market conditions have a mixed 
impact on export activities. The most consistent finding is that firms covered by 
collective bargaining agreements are less likely to be exporters and export less.  
Keywords:  multinational firms, exports, firm heterogeneity, productivity, 
financial constraints, employment conditions  
JEL-classification: F2,  G2 
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1 Motivation 
The dominance of large firms in international markets has become one of the main 
stylized facts in the international trade literature. Multinational firms and exporters are 
larger than their domestic counterparts, and these size differences are largely driven by 
differences in productivity across firms. But productivity may not be the only factor 
affecting firms’ export activities. In this paper, we explore whether firm-level 
heterogeneity with regard to internationalization is also driven by differences in firms’ 
access to external finance or differences with regard to employment conditions that firms 
are facing at home. For this purpose, we use detailed micro-level data for German firms 
providing information on firms’ export activities, their size and productivity, financial 
frictions, and labor market conditions. 
From a theoretical point of view, our empirical approach is motivated by a model 
proposed by Melitz (2003). (See Greenaway and Kneller (2007) for a recent survey.) The 
key to the Melitz-model and its extensions is that, ex ante, firms do not know their 
productivity. Upon entry, firms draw their productivity level from a commonly known 
productivity distribution. Depending on the level of productivity, they exit the market, 
they produce only for the domestic market, or they become exporters. The reasons for 
different patterns of production and of market entry are fixed and variable costs of 
entering new markets. Costs of entering domestic markets are lower than the costs of 
exporting. 
The implicit assumption in these models is that financial markets are fully developed and 
that firms can either finance foreign operations internally and/or without incurring an   3
external finance premium. This assumption is at odds with the large literature on financial 
restrictions that in particular smaller firms are facing. In the Melitz-model, firms are 
small and cannot enter foreign markets because they make a bad productivity draw. In 
reality, firms that are small are also particularly disadvantaged on capital markets due to 
information asymmetries. Hence, they face an additional barrier to going international. 
Our data indeed show that smaller firms are more likely to face financial constraints than 
larger firms (Table 1a). At the same time, the data indicate that larger firms are more 
likely to face restrictive employment conditions at home. They report expected wage cost 
problems, expected personnel shortages, or problems with workers protection laws more 
often than smaller firms. Larger firms are also covered by industry-wide wage 
agreements more often than smaller firms, and worker councils are active in larger firms 
only. 
To motivate our analysis theoretically, we would ideally need a model which features 
firm-level heterogeneity with regard to productivity, financial frictions, and labor market 
conditions simultaneously. Yet, to the best of our knowledge, such a model is not 
available. We thus refer to models which extend the model by Melitz (2003) in order to 
take into account financial constraints. Chaney (2005) emphasizes the importance of 
firm-level liquidity constraints for sorting into foreign markets in the presence of 
exchange rate fluctuations. In Manova (2006), firms are heterogeneous with regard to 
their productivity, and they need external funds to finance the costs of exporting. The 
amount of external finance that firms can raise depends on the tangibility of firms’ assets 
and on contract enforceability. Asset tangibility differs across sectors, and contract 
enforceability differs across countries. The model implies different productivity cut-off   4
levels for the selection into exporting. Highly productive firms can offer higher returns to 
creditors and are thus less credit constrained than less productive firms. In this sense, 
credit constraints reinforce the negative impact of low productivity for entry into foreign 
markets (extensive margin) and for the volume of exports (intensive margin). These 
predictions are tested using country-level data. Results show that financially developed 
countries are more likely to export bilaterally and to ship greater volumes.  
Our focus will be in the impact of frictions at the firm-level. Previous firm-level evidence 
on the impact of financial constraints on the probability of exporting provides mixed 
results.
1 Greenaway et al. (2007) use a panel of 9,292 UK manufacturing firms over the 
period 1993 to 2002 and find that exporters exhibit better financial conditions than 
domestic firms. But when differentiating between continuous exporters and firms starting 
to export, they find that export-starters are in a worse financial state than continuous 
exporters and domestic firms. Exporting improves firms’ financial health, but the 
hypothesis that financially healthy firms are more likely to become exporters is not 
supported. Similarly, Stiebale (2008) uses French firm-level data and fails to find a 
significant effect of financial constraints on exporting. In contrast, Du and Girma (2007) 
present empirical evidence on the role of financial constraints for Chinese exporters and 
find that better access to bank loans is associated with greater export market orientation.  
                                                 
1   Bridges and Guariglia (2006) test the impact of internationalization and financial constraints on 
firms’ survival probabilities. Using a panel of 9,420 newly established UK firms over the period 1997-
2002, they find that a higher collateral and a lower leverage ratio result in lower failure probabilities, while 
exporting or being foreign owned does not significantly affect these probabilities.   5
We depart from the existing literature in two ways. First, instead of using aggregated data 
as Manova (2006), we use firm level-data. Second, we simultaneously model the impact 
of productivity, financial frictions, and employment conditions on the foreign activities of 
German firms. We test three main hypotheses. The first is that low productivity serves as 
a barrier to foreign entry. The second is that firms with limited access to external finance 
are less likely to export. The third is that firms facing restrictive employment conditions 
which lower their productivity and/or increase wage costs are less likely to export. 
To test these hypotheses, we use of a detailed firm-level survey of German firms. The 
main focus of this survey, the IAB Establishment-Level Panel, lies on labor market and 
employment conditions at the plant level.
2 In recent surveys, firms have additionally been 
asked about their international activities and about the financial constraints that they are 
facing.  In the following second part, we develop the theoretical hypotheses underlying 
our study. In part three, we present descriptive statistics on productivity, financial 
constraints, employment conditions, and exports. Part four contains our regression 
results, and part five concludes. We find that larger and more productive firms are more 
likely to be exporters. They also export more than smaller and less productive firms. 
Financial frictions affect the probability of exporting more than the volume of exporting. 
Also, being covered by a collective bargaining agreement has a negative impact on export 
activities. Personnel shortages increase the probability of exporting. 
                                                 
2   Throughout the paper, we use the term ‚firm’ to denote the unit of observations in the empirical 
model, i.e. the individual plant. In 2006, 88% of the observed plants were independent firms. Our main 
findings do not change if the analysis is conducted with the sample of independent firms only.   6
2  Theoretical Hypotheses  
The aim of this paper is to show the importance of (low) productivity, financial 
constraints, and employment conditions as barriers to entry into foreign markets. To 
motivate our analysis theoretically, we ideally need a model which features all of these 
aspects. Yet, to the best of our knowledge, such a model is not available. Hence, we 
mainly draw on a model by Manova (2006) which extends the model by Melitz (2003), in 
order to take financial constraints into account. The model assumes a world with J 
countries and S sectors. Since the theoretical framework is similar to the standard Melitz-
model, we focus in the following on the model’s implications arising from financial 
frictions.  
Firms face different costs of operating in the home and in the foreign market. There are 
no fixed costs of serving the home market, and variable costs of production can be 
financed from cash flow. But production for the domestic market in country j and sector s 
requires variable costs  js ac , where a denotes the inverse of the firm’s productivity. The 
variable costs  js c  capture differences in factor prices across countries and differences in 
factor intensities across sectors. Although labor market frictions are not modeled 
explicitly, differences in productivity across firms can also be interpreted in terms of 
these frictions. Firms, for instance, which report wage cost problems or problems with 
worker protection laws, are likely to be less productive and to produce at higher costs 
than firms not reporting these problems.  
Exporting by a firm from country j to a foreign market i involves a fixed cost  ij js f c  for 
market entry and variable iceberg trading costs  0 > ij τ . While variable costs can be   7
financed internally, the fixed costs of exporting require an industry-specific share of 
external finance  1 0 < < s d . Similarly, the share of intangible assets that firms can pledge 
as collateral is industry-specific: 1 0 < < s t . 
A final parameter that describes the financial structure of the model is related to the level 
of financial contractibility. With probability  1 0 < < j λ , financial contracts are enforced. 
Since we consider firms from one country only, we have  λ λ = j . 
Firms maximize their expected profits under the constraints (i) imposed by the production 
function, (ii) the investor’s participation constraint, and (iii) the firm’s participation 
constraint. In the absence of credit constraints, the investor’s participation constraint does 
not bind, and the model has the same implications as the Melitz-model. If credit 
constraints bind though, the productivity cut-off for exporting depends on the importance 
of credit frictions. 
In contrast to this model, which has predictions for the volume of exports between 
countries, our unit of analysis is the individual firm. Applying a similar logic as above, 
we can specify the probability of a given firm k to export in period t as: 
()01 2 , 1 3 , 1 , 1
1
Pr '
KL
kt s k t k t k t kt
kt
Y
Xd d X
L
α αα α α α ε −− −
−
⎛⎞ = + + + ⋅+ ⋅+ + ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
 (1) 
where  () Pr k X  is the probability of firm k being an exporter.  0 α ,  1 α , and  2 α  are scalar 
coefficients, α and  3 α  are column vectors of regression coefficients, αs are sector fixed 
effects.  kt ´ ε is the error term. We include firm-level proxies for financial constraints   8
( ,1 −
K
kt d ), for employment conditions ( ,1 −
L
kt d ), and a set of control variables  ,1 − kt x . We will 
return to the measurement of these factors below (Section 4.1). 
We use equation (1) to test three main hypotheses. First, more productive firms are more 
likely to be exporters and also ship greater volumes. Hence,  1 α  should be positive. 
Second, tighter financial constraints lower the probability of exporting and export 
volumes. Hence,  2 α  should be negative. Third, firms facing adverse employment 
conditions at home which lower productivity are less likely to become exporters. 
Accordingly, if  ,1 −
L
kt d  measures adverse employment conditions, we expect a negative 
sign for  3 α . 
3  Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The theoretical hypotheses derived above are tested using a representative establishment-
level panel data-set for 16,000 German firms (IAB-Betriebspanel) .  ( T a b l e  A 1  i n  t h e  
Appendix provides an overview of the data.) Firms covered by the survey provide 
information on whether and how much they export. Most German firms are active only 
domestically. Only approximately 12% of all firms serve foreign markets via exporting. 
In this section, we describe the main patterns in the data with regard to financial 
constraints, employment conditions, and productivity, and we link these patterns to the 
export activities of firms. 
3.1 Financial  Constraints 
Our data allow measuring financial constraints in two ways. First, we use self-reported 
information on the presence of financial constraints. In 2004, firms that invested into real   9
estate, information and communication technology, production facilities, plant and 
equipment, or transportation equipment were asked whether they faced problems to raise 
outside capital on the private capital market (yes / no). Firms also report whether these 
difficulties had negative implications for their plant-level investment activities. Second, 
firms report the share of investment that is financed by cash flow. We interpret a high 
share of cash flow as evidence for high internal funds and thus low financial constraints.  
Overall, 9% of all firms that have invested in 2004 self-report financial constraints. Table 
1a also shows that the presence of financial constraints is related to the size of firms. 
Whereas 10% of all firms with 1-4 employees report financial constraints, only 4% of 
those with more than 500 employees do so. If financial constraints constitute a barrier to 
exporting, this could explain why only the larger German firms export. 
Table 1b provides additional evidence on the importance of financial constraints across 
sectors. A capital-intensive production may, for instance, call for higher financial needs. 
Also, industries with a large share of firm-specific capital used in the production process 
and low inventories of intermediate and final goods may have difficulties to pledge 
collateral. To check whether differences in financial constraints prevail across industries, 
Data reported in Table 1b indeed display heterogeneity between different industries 
regarding the share of credit constrained firms. The share of credit-constrained firms is 
lower in the service sector than in manufacturing and transportation. 
3.2 Employment  Conditions 
The IAB Establishment-Level Panel also provides detailed information on employment 
conditions. We use information on the importance of personnel shortages, wage cost   10
problems, problems regarding worker protection laws, the existence of a worker council, 
and coverage by collective bargaining agreements. These frictions could be additional 
barriers or triggers to entry into foreign markets. Additionally, we have information on 
the share of high- and low-skilled employment. 
Overall, about 39% of all firms are subject to collective bargaining agreements. Nearly a 
third of the firms (31%) expect high labor costs. Every fifth firm has a worker council 
and expects personnel shortages. Problems regarding worker protection laws and firm-
specific collective bargaining agreements seem to be less of a problem for most firms. 
While financial constraints are more binding for the smaller firms, Table 1a shows that 
most labor market constraints are more relevant for the larger firms. To some extent, this 
is due to the fact that some of these constraints are related to legislation that does not 
cover small firms with less than 20 employees. This particularly holds for worker 
councils and collective bargaining agreements. Yet, even for firms with more than 20 
employees, reported employment problems increase continuously in firm size. For 
example, 64% of firms with more than 500 employees report to suffer from high labor 
costs. Every second firm in this size group reports personnel shortages.  
3.3  Technology and Productivity 
Lacking information on the capital stock, we measure productivity using sales or value 
added per employee. We correct for part-time workers and calculate value added as sales 
minus intermediate inputs. For the years 2003 and 2005, firms also provide information 
on their level of technology. Technology is measured in an ordinal scale from 1 (best) to 
5 (worst). Since firms using more modern and efficient technologies are more productive,   11
we expect a negative impact of this variable on the extensive and intensive margin of 
exporting. 
3.4 Are  Exporters  Different? 
Evidence presented so far shows that smaller German firms are more likely to be 
financially constrained, that larger firms are more likely to face adverse employment 
conditions, and that firms also differ with regard to their productivity and technology 
used. In this section, we analyze whether these features are related to the export activities 
of firms. 
Table 2 gives an overview on indicators of German firms, differentiated by their self-
reported financial constraints and employment conditions. Table 2a shows that financially 
constrained firms differ significantly from unconstrained firms. Financially constrained 
firms are less productive than their non-restricted counterparts. These firms are smaller in 
terms of size (measured as the number of employees) and have lower sales. Additionally, 
their export volume is lower. There is one main exception. Even though their export 
volume is smaller, firms facing restricted access to outside credit are more likely to 
export. Furthermore, since these firms are smaller, they show a slightly higher export-
sales-ratio.  
Moreover, we can group firms into those exporting to the Euro area and those exporting 
to countries outside the Euro area. Because of higher export entry costs in the latter case, 
we expect that firms which export to these countries face lower credit constraints. We in 
fact find that firms exporting to countries outside the Euro area report to be financially   12
constrained less often (10% of the firms) than those exporting to countries outside the 
Euro area (12%). 
One major proposition of Manova (2006) is that firms subject to credit constraints need to 
be more productive in order to become exporters than firms without financial restrictions. 
Table 3 displays mean labor productivity for credit constrained and unconstrained firms 
by export status. While export firms are more productive than domestic firms, the data do 
not support the hypothesis that financially constrained exporters are more productive than 
their unconstrained counterparts. 
Table 2b gives similar information for different employment conditions. Firms subject to 
labor market restrictions differ from other firms. Firms facing high labor costs, personnel 
shortages, and problems regarding worker protection laws, as well as firms being covered 
by collective bargaining and having worker councils are bigger in terms employees and 
sales than firms not facing these conditions. With the exception of firms subject to 
collective bargaining these firms are also more export orientated: they export more often 
and they have a higher export-to-sales ratio. In the empirical analysis below, we will 
disentangle whether the higher propensity to export is related to employment conditions 
or whether it merely captures a size effect. 
In terms of productivity, there are some differences. Firms that report labor cost problems 
are less productive than those which do not report such problems. Firms with a worker 
council or that are subject to collective bargaining agreements are more productive. This 
seems to be a size effect, though. There are no obvious effects of employment conditions 
on the level of technology used in the firms.    13
4  Barriers to Internationalization: Regression Results 
Our aim in this paper is to disentangle productivity, financial frictions, and employment 
conditions as barriers for firms’ entry into foreign markets. We have three main 
hypotheses. First, we expect a positive effect of productivity on the probability to become 
an exporter and the volume of exports. Second, we expect that financial constraints 
hinder exporting. Third, labor market conditions that lower firms’ productivity can 
constitute a barrier to exporting as well.  
4.1 Explanatory  Variables 
We test the effects of financial and employment conditions on the probability of 
becoming an exporter and on the volume of exports by estimating equation (1). The 
empirical analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we estimate a Heckman selection model to 
analyze the determinants of the selection into exporting (the extensive margin) and of the 
volume of exports (the intensive margin). Second, to check the robustness of our results, 
we run probit models to analyze the determinants of the probability of starting to export 
or to increase the volume of exports. In this latter specification, the dependent 
dichotomous variable takes the value of 1 if firms increase exports and 0 if firms decrease 
exports or do not export at all. For each model, we present specifications including and 
excluding proxies for financial constraints or variables measuring employment conditions 
to further check the robustness of our results. 
We specify the explanatory variables in equation (1) as follows. Productivity is measured 
as 
,1 −
⎛⎞
⎜⎟
⎝⎠ kt
Y
L
 which gives labor productivity in t-1. The expected sign is positive.    14
Financial constraints ( ,1 −
K
kt d ) are measured using self-reported financial constraints. We 
expect a negative sign.
3 Firms that are able to finance a higher share of their investment 
with cash flow should also face less severe financial constraints; hence the expected sign 
is positive.  
Employment conditions are measured by a vector  ,1 −
L
kt d  which includes dummy variables 
indicating whether a firm reports adverse employment conditions. Additionally we 
include the share of unskilled employees. The sign of the employment variables is not 
clear a priori. Employment conditions could constitute a barrier to firms’ export activities 
if they lower the productivity of firms. Accordingly, firms reporting high wage costs or 
personnel shortages should be less likely to be exporters. Similarly, if collective 
bargaining agreements, the presence of worker councils, or worker protection laws 
impose costs on firms and reduce their flexibility, firms should become less likely to 
export. At the same time, more rigid employment conditions at home may also increase 
the incentives of firms to engage in international markets and to stabilize their sales 
through exports. Through this channel, rigid employment conditions could also increase 
the probability of firms to export. 
Among our lagged control variables  ,1 − kt x  the reported level of technology as a discrete, 
ordinal variable from 1 (best) to 5 (worst) serves as a proxy for collateralizable assets. 
We expect this variable to have a negative impact. We also control for firm-level R&D 
activity and innovative output, which should have a positive impact on exporting, and 
                                                 
3   We have also estimated an equation with an interaction term between productivity and financial 
constraints. Since this interaction term has been insignificant, results are not reported.   15
problems regarding innovation, for which we expect a negative impact. Finally, the 
vector of control variables includes a measure for firm size (log employment).  
4.2  Heckman Selection Model 
Our main empirical model to analyze the determinants of the extensive and intensive 
margin of firms’ exports is a Heckman selection model (Table 4). For the identification of 
the selection equation, we include dummy variables for collective bargaining agreements, 
worker councils, and a variable indicating whether the firm is located in Eastern or 
Western Germany. These variables are excluded from the outcome equation. We report 
results for the maximum likelihood estimation; these do not differ significantly from the 
results of the two step estimation approach. 
The first result is that selection into exporting (i.e. the extensive margin) does not affect 
the firms’ choice of the volume of exports (i.e. the intensive margin). The coefficient 
estimate for the Mills Ratio is insignificant throughout. 
Results presented in Table 5 also show that both, selection into exporting and the volume 
of exports are positively related to size and productivity. However, we cannot find any 
effects for the (self-reported) level of technology. 
The self-reported measure of financial constraints affects the selection into exporting and 
the intensive margin of exporting in a different way. There is a significantly positive 
impact of financial constraints on the probability of being an exporter but no effect on the 
volume of exports. This result is robust with regard to including additional control 
variables. The positive impact of financial constraints on the probability of being an 
exporter is surprising at first sight as it suggests that exporters are more, not less   16
financially constrained than non-exporters. The fact that the majority of the firms in our 
sample do not switch exporter status over time can help explain this perhaps 
counterintuitive result. According to this interpretation, exporters have tighter financial 
constraints  ex post. Below, we will also analyze whether tighter ex ante financial 
constraints affect the probability of starting to export. Cash flow as an additional measure 
of financial constraints has a positive and significant impact on firms’ expansions along 
the extensive and the intensive margin, as expected.  
Regarding employment conditions, we find the most consistent result for collective 
bargaining agreements. Being covered by a collective bargaining agreement lowers the 
probability of exporting. High wage costs have a negative impact on the volume of 
activities; problems with workers protection legislation lower the probability of 
exporting. These results would be consistent with the hypothesis that rigid employment 
conditions at home lower firms’ productivity and limit their propensity to export. 
Problems with personnel shortages, in contrast, increase the probability of firms to 
become exporters. One explanation for this effect could be that some of the exporters in 
our sample are also multinationals which operate production facilities abroad. Finally, the 
presence of workers councils and the share of low-skilled employees have no significant 
impact. 
Several control variables are significant. The dummy variable for R&D activity affects 
both, the export volume and the selection into exporting, in a highly significant and 
positive way. Innovation activity has an (positive) impact only on the extensive margin.    17
In sum, financial constraints affect the extensive more than the intensive margin. 
Productivity and technology, in contrast, matter relatively more for the expansion along 
the intensive margin. The impact of employment conditions is similar. 
4.3 Probit  Regressions 
Tables 5 and 6 provide results for the determinants of being an export starter (extensive 
margin), and the probability to increase the share of exports in total sales (intensive 
margin).  
Regression results with regard to export starters (Table 5) show a positive influence of 
productivity. However, the effect of productivity becomes weaker in terms of 
significance when additionally including measures of financial frictions. Financing 
constraints have a negative and significant impact on the probability to become an 
exporter. Taken together with the positive link between financial constraints and exporter 
status (see Table 4), this finding is consistent with a negative impact of ex ante financial 
constraints on the probability to start exporting and a positive link between ex post 
financial constraints on exporter status. 
Measures for technology or R&D activity have no significant impact on the probability to 
start exporting. Size (the log of employment) has no significant impact on the probability 
to start exporting, which is consistent with the relatively small impact of productivity. 
Employment conditions have an impact on the probability to become an exporter as well. 
Firms covered by collective bargaining agreements are less likely to be exporters than 
firms not covered by these agreements.    18
Overall, results for the probit model support those for the Heckman selection equation 
concerning the impact of productivity and employment conditions. However, the 
implications for the impact of financial frictions differ. One explanation for these 
differences is that, in the probit model, we estimate the probability of becoming an 
exporter for the first time. In the Heckman selection equation, we estimate whether a firm 
is an exporter or not. Since first-time entry is associated with higher fixed costs, we 
would expect a stronger impact of financial constraints.  
Turning next to the determinants of an increase in the volume of exports, i.e. the intensive 
margin, some of the above results change (Table 6). In contrast to results for the 
extensive margin of firms’ exports, size is now positive and highly significant. 
Productivity is highly significant as well. Also, there is evidence that technology matters. 
Firms reporting R&D and innovations increase their exports relative to their total sales, 
and firms reporting innovation problems do not increase their export-to-sales ratios. As 
regards the impact of the employment situation, the picture is similar to the one painted 
before. Firms with personnel shortages increase exports, and firms covered by collective 
bargaining decrease exports. With regard to the impact of financial constraints, the 
picture is less clear cut. Cash flow is positive and significant. Self-reported financial 
constraints are insignificant. By and large, these results are in line with those for the 
determinants of the intensive margin obtained from the Heckman model. 
5 Conclusions 
Firms that are active on international markets are larger than their domestic counterparts. 
In this paper, we analyze to what extent differences in internationalization patterns of   19
firms are the result of differences in productivity and technology, differences in access to 
external finance, or differences in employment conditions at home. 
We use a detailed firm-level dataset for German firms to analyze the importance of 
financial and employment conditions versus productivity constraints for exports of 
German firms. Our paper has three main findings. 
First, being small and having a low productivity constitutes a barrier to exporting. In this 
sense, our results are in line with earlier research on export behavior at the firm-level. 
Second, our results suggest a complementary interpretation of the fact that exporters are 
larger than domestic firms. Firms that are subject to financial constraints are smaller and 
less productive than other firms. Financial constrained firms, in turn, are less likely to 
become exporters for the first time and they export smaller volumes than larger, less 
financially constrained firms.  
Third, employment conditions have a significant impact on export activities  as well. 
Since adverse employment conditions affect large firms more than smaller firms, this 
effect partly counteracts the impact of productivity and financial frictions. In particular 
the presence of collective bargaining agreements has a significantly negative impact on 
firms’ export activities. High wage costs and tight worker protection legislation have a 
negative impact in some specifications as well. Also, firms with personnel shortages at 
home are more likely to become internationally active. This could be due to the fact that 
some of the exporters under study here also maintain production affiliates abroad. 
Our results have important policy implications as they show that financial constraints 
matter for the export activities of firms. Financial constraints could thus be one channel   20
through which the recent financial crisis spills over into the real economy. In fact, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that access to trade credit has become more restricted 
recently. According to our results, this tightening of credit may particularly affect new 
exporters. 
   21
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7 Appendix 
Table A1: Data Definitions and Availability  
The empirical analysis in this paper is based on data taken from the IAB Establishment-Level Panel ( IAB Betriebspanel). (See 
http://betriebspanel.iab.de/infos.htm for details.) The following Table gives a summary of data available from the IAB Establishment-Level Panel, which are used 
for this project. The IAB Establishment-Level Panel is a large panel dataset, which is representative for German firms. The panel is a survey of German firms 
with a special focus on employment conditions. The survey has been conducted annually since 1993, and panel data are available for about 16,000 plants 
representative of all sectors and size classes. 
Measured in  Referring to period    Measurement 
2004 2005 2006 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Financial constraints  Dummy variable reporting problems to raise external capital for 
investments (see section 3.1)   x      x    
Cash flow  Share of cash flow in investments    x        x     
Export share  Share of foreign sales in total sales   x  x  x  (x)  x  x  x  (x) 
Productivity  Labor productivity (value added / employment), Value added is sales 
less intermediate inputs   x x x 
 
(x) 
x x x  (x) 
Investment subsidies  Share of subsidies in financing investments  x  x      x  x     
Level of technology  Discrete variable from 1 (best) to 5 (worst) (self reported)    x  x        x  x 
Expected personnel 
shortage 
Dummy variable reporting personnel shortage, Reasons: 1. Lack of 
employees, junior staff or skilled employees; 2. Demand for vocational 
training; 3. Brain drain  
x        x  x 
Expected wage cost 
problems  
Dummy variable reporting wage cost problems, Reasons: 1. 
Abundance of human resources; 2. Problems with wage costs  x        x  x 
Expected problems with 
worker protection laws  
Dummy variable reporting problems with worker protection laws 
Reasons: 1. Maternity protection; 2. Partial retirement; 3. Part-time 
occupation  
x        x  x 
Worker council   Dummy variable reporting existence of  a works council  x          x     
Collective bargaining   Dummy variable reporting existence of collective bargaining in any 
modality  x       x    
Share of unskilled 
employees  Number of unskilled employees divided by total employment   x  x  x      x  x  x 
R&D   Dummy variable reporting existence of R&D activity  x          x     
Innovations   Dummy variable reporting whether innovations are implemented  x      x  x  x     
Innovation problems   Dummy variable reporting innovation problems   x      x  x  x       23
Table A2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Observations  Mean  Standard 
deviation 
Sales productivity (sales / employment) (2006)  10,191  131,453  222,031 
Labor productivity (value added / employment) (2006)  9,243  58,221  105,841 
Value added (2006)  9,244  889,959  11,439,708 
Employees (2006) (full time equivalent)  15,444  14  98 
Employees (2006)  15,449  17  109 
Expected wage cost problems (2004)  10,923  31 %  0.46 
Expected personnel shortage (2004)  10,923  19 %  0.39 
Expected problems with worker protection laws (2004)  10,923  5 %  0.23 
Worker council (2004)  12,938  19 %  0.40 
Industry-wide collective bargaining agreement (2004)  10,899 39  %  0.487 
Firm-specific collective bargaining agreement (2004)  10,899 3  %  0.17 
Share of unskilled employees (2006)  15,499  17 %  0.26 
Share of skilled employees (2006)  15,449  7 %  0.21 
R&D (0/1) (2004)  10,923  5 %  0.22 
Innovative firms (2004)  10,923  28 %  0.45 
Innovation problems (2004)  10,923  8 %  0.27 
Level of technology (1 best, 5 worst) (2005)  12,727  2.19  1.08 
Mean share of cash flow used in investments (2005)  8,370  69 %  43 
Source: IAB Betriebspanel, own calculations 
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Table 1: Share of Firms Subject to Credit and Labor Market Constraints  
Data are for the year 2004 and are given in percent of all firms. For reason of data confidentiality, the 
agricultural and the financial sector as well as public services are not displayed. However, these sectors are 
included in the regression analysis. 
(a) By Size 
  1-4 
employees 
5-19 
employees 
20-99 
employees 
100-249 
employees 
250-499 
employees 
500 + 
employees 
Share of credit 
constrained firms  10%  8%     9%        4%        6%         4% 
Expected wage 
cost problems  19% 35%    50% 57% 57% 64% 
Expected 
personnel 
shortage 
11%    19% 34% 43% 51% 52% 
Expected 
problems with 
worker protection 
laws 
1%  6% 12% 23% 24% 33% 
Industry-wide 
collective 
bargaining  
27% 43% 51% 63% 68% 80% 
Firm-specific 
collective 
bargaining 
1%  3%  6% 10% 12% 11% 
Worker  council 7% 20% 50% 79% 90% 96% 
(b) By Sector 
  Manufac-
turing 
Construc-
tion 
Retail and 
whole sale 
Transpor-
tation 
Business 
services 
Other 
services 
Share of credit 
constrained firms  11% 8%  10%  12% 9% 7% 
Expected wage cost 
problems  40% 42% 29% 32% 26% 29% 
Expected personnel 
shortage  27% 20% 17% 23% 17% 17% 
Expected problems 
with worker protection 
laws 
5% 1% 5% 4% 4% 7% 
Industry-wide 
collective bargaining  45% 59% 37% 32% 15% 39% 
Firm-specific 
collective bargaining  3% 2% 3% 4% 2% 3% 
Worker council  24%  10%  15%  23%  13%  22% 
Source: IAB Betriebspanel, own calculations   25
Table 2: Performance Indicators by Type of Firm 
(a) By Financial Constraints 
  Financial constraints  
(Self-reported) 
 Yes  No 
Share of exporting firms (%)  19  15 
Export-sales-ratio (%)  6  4 
Mean export volume (1,000 Euro)  253.8  797.4 
Mean number of employees  17  24 
Mean sales (1,000 Euro)  1,862  9,743 
Mean labor productivity (1,000 Euro)  41.7  62.5 
Mean level of technological equipment (1 newest, 5 
oldest)  2.1 2.3 
(b) By Employment Conditions 
  
Wage cost 
problems 
Personnel 
shortage 
Worker 
protection laws 
Collective 
bargaining  Worker council 
   Yes  No  Yes No Yes No Yes No  Yes  No 
Share of exporting 
firms (%)  13  10  20 9 16 10 8 12 19 9
Export-sales-ratio 
(%)  3 3 5 2 4 3 2 4  5 2
Mean export 
volume 
(1,000 Euro) 
732.9 261.8  1,081.1 255.2 2,153.3 323.3 751.9 231.5  2,328.4  83.8
Mean number of 
employees  28  13  34 14 57 15 26 12 53 9
Mean sales 
(1,000 Euro)  3,759.9 1,793.9 4,802.9 1,867.3 9,105.7 2,079.9 3,968.7 1,594.2 10,289.1 1,003.6
Mean labor 
productivity 
(1,000 Euro) 
54.4 63.1 60.5 60.1 62.8 60.0 66.3 56.7  78.7 55.0
Mean level of 
technological 
equipment (1 
newest, 5 oldest) 
2.3 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2  2.2 2.2
Source: IAB Betriebspanel, own calculations 
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Table 3: Mean Labor Productivity by Export Status and Credit Constraints 
Credit constraints are based on self-reported answers to the question whether a given firm faced credit 
constraints. Data are in Euro for the year 2004. 
 Domestic  firms  Exporters 
Unconstrained firms   60,467  79,521 
Financially constrained 
firms 
39,583 65,158 
Source: IAB Betriebspanel, own calculations   27
Table 4: Determinants of Exports – Heckman Selection Model 
This Table gives results of the distributed lag cross-sectional Heckman selection regression of the volume of 
export activity on various lagged regressors. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of volume of exports 
(in Euro) in 2005. The variables worker council, collective bargaining, and East Germany are excluded from the 
volume regression for identification. Robust z statistics in parenthesis * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Volume Selection Volume Selection Volume Selection Volume Selection 
log Productivity (t-1)  1.061*** 0.307*** 1.108*** 0.342*** 1.164*** 0.325*** 1.108*** 0.310*** 
  (18.00) (10.45) (19.98) (13.96) (21.17) (12.97) (19.24) (10.25) 
log Employees  1.128*** 0.256*** 1.158*** 0.270*** 1.093*** 0.223*** 1.087*** 0.184*** 
  (32.50) (13.93) (36.94) (17.38) (39.43) (13.98) (37.60)  (9.43) 
Financial constraints 0/1 (t-1)  0.105  0.183**       -0.006  0.079*** 
  (0.81)  (2.06)       (0.15)  (2.92) 
Cash flow (share) (t-1)  0.002**  0.002***        
  (2.29)  (3.67)        
Wage cost problems 0/1  (t-1)     -0.175***  -0.063     -0.111*  -0.054 
     (2.80)  (1.57)     (1.65)  (1.11) 
Personnel shortage 0/1  (t-2)     0.054  0.257***     -0.019  0.153*** 
     (0.81)  (6.18)     (0.28)  (3.08) 
Problems with worker  
protection laws 0/1  (t-1)     -0.019  -0.185***     -0.011  -0.130* 
     (0.21)  (2.92)     (0.12)  (1.78) 
Share of unskilled employees (t-1)     -0.184  -0.153*     -0.008  0.091 
     (1.45)  (1.86)     (0.05)  (0.89) 
Worker council 0/1  (t-1)   -0.013  -0.013  -0.064  -0.020 
   (0.25)  (0.25)  (1.20)  (0.33) 
Collective bargaining 0/1    -0.528***  -0.537***  -0.481***  -0.498*** 
   (10.12)  (12.17)  (10.55)   (9.32) 
R&D (t-1)       0.703***  0.654***  0.576***  0.654*** 
       (7.34)  (12.30)  (5.51)  (11.07) 
Innovations 0/1       0.027  0.301***  0.004  0.240*** 
       (0.32)  (6.88)  (0.04)  (4.65) 
Innovation problems 0/1  (t-1)       -0.089  0.032  -0.038  0.072 
       (1.10)  (0.54)  (0.45)  (1.09) 
Bad technology 1/5  (t-1)       -0.045  0.027    
       (1.11)  (1.04)    
East Germany 0/1   -0.205***  -0.263***  -0.250***  -0.210*** 
   (4.08)  (6.04)  (5.79)  (3.91) 
Mills Ratio  -0.1593 0.081 0.199   -0.169
  (0.79) (0.47) (1.13)   (0.83)
Constant  -2.722*** -4.040*** -3.347*** -4.383*** -4.173*** -4.485*** -3.186*** -4.108*** 
  (3.16) (11.22) (4.12) (14.44) (4.97) (14.11) (3.71) (10.83) 
Observations  4,689 4,689 7,742 7,742 7,493 7,493 4,789 4,789 28 
Table 5: Determinants of Export Starters (Extensive Margin) 
In this Table we present the output of the distributed lag cross-sectional probit regression of export starters (0/1) 
on various lagged regressors. The dependent variable takes the value 1 if a firm has not been exporting in 2004 but 
started to export in 2005 and 0 otherwise. Robust z statistics in parenthesis. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
log Productivity (t-1)  0.079*** 0.052  0.061 0.089***  0.074** 0.067* 
  (2.64) (1.51) (1.58) (2.80) (2.37) (1.82) 
log  Employees  0.017 0.006 -0.008  0.056**  0.011 0.042 
  (1.01) (0.30) (0.39) (2.28) (0.57) (1.48) 
Financial constraints 0/1 (t-1)   -0.035**  -0.043**    -0.041** 
   (2.03)  (2.29)    (2.35) 
Cash flow (share) (t-1)     -0.001     
     ( 1 . 5 6 )      
Wage cost problems  0/1 (t-1)       0.005  0.023 
       (0.08)  (0.31) 
Personnel shortage 0/1  (t-2)       0.113    0.145** 
       (1.64)  (1.97) 
Problems with worker protection laws 0/1  (t-1)      -0.037  -0.053 
       (0.34)  (0.47) 
Worker council 0/1  (t-1)       -0.109  -0.135 
       (1.16)  (1.38) 
Collective bargaining 0/1 (t-1)       -0.225***  -0.240***
       (3.26)  (3.19) 
Share of unskilled employment (t-1)       -0.163  -0.074 
       (1.31)  (0.55) 
R&D  0/1 (t-1)       -0.053  -0.004 
       (0.54)  (0.04) 
Innovations  0/1       0.133*  0.056 
       (1.92)  (0.74) 
Innovation problems 0/1  (t-1)       -0.058  -0.022 
       (0.59)  (0.22) 
Bad technology 0/1  (t-1)       -0.056   
       ( 1 . 4 0 )    
Constant -2.786*** -2.441*** -2.416*** -2.892*** -2.615*** -2.662***
  (8.10) (6.16) (5.33) (7.88) (6.90) (6.27) 
Industry dummies  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations  8,069 6,332 5,028 8,053 7,822 6,323 
Pseudo  R–squared  0.0202 0.0156 0.0181 0.0304 0.0244 0.0290 
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Table 6: Determinants of an Increase of Export Volume (Intensive Margin)  
In this Table we present the output of the distributed lag cross-sectional probit regression of an increase in export 
activity (0/1) on various lagged regressors. The dependent variable takes the value 1 if the firm increased its share 
of exports in total sales from 2004 to 2005 and 0 otherwise. Robust z statistics in parenthesis. * significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
log Productivity (t-1)  0.180*** 0.139*** 0.127*** 0.194*** 0.164*** 0.151*** 
  (7.75) (5.52) (4.56) (8.05) (6.74) (5.72) 
log  Employees  0.125*** 0.113*** 0.117*** 0.159*** 0.090*** 0.115*** 
  (10.84)  (8.90) (8.10) (9.65) (6.86) (6.18) 
Financial constraints 0/1 (t-1)   -0.015  -0.01      -0.028* 
   (1.04)  (0.63)    (1.95) 
Cash flow (share) (t-1)     0.001**     
     ( 2 . 0 6 )      
Wage cost problems 0/1  (t-1)       -0.043  -0.045 
       (0.97)  (0.93) 
Personnel shortage 0/1  (t-2)       0.153***    0.113** 
       (3.26)  (2.27) 
Problems with worker protection laws 0/1  (t-1)      -0.018  -0.003 
       (0.26)  (0.04) 
Worker council 0/1  (t-1)       0.007    -0.041 
       (0.11)  (0.64) 
Collective bargaining 0/1         -0.356***    -0.322***
       (7.37)  (6.21) 
Share of unskilled employment (t-1)       -0.09    0.054 
       (1.07)  (0.59) 
R&D (t-1)       0.334***  0.336*** 
       (5.75)  (5.67) 
Innovations  0/1       0.230***  0.165*** 
       (4.74)  (3.15) 
Innovation problems 0/1  (t-1)       -0.132**  -0.097 
       (1.99)  (1.46) 
Bad technology 1/5  (t-1)       -0.034   
       ( 1 . 1 6 )    
Constant -3.407*** -2.849*** -2.776*** -3.550*** -3.244*** -3.102***
  (12.94) (9.92)  (8.60) (12.83)  (11.11)  (10.18) 
Industry dummies  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations  8,069 6,332 5,028 8,053 7,822 6,323 
Pseudo  R–squared  0.1383 0.1273 0.1296 0.1517 0.1584 0.1533 
 